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Abstract: Primary Objective: To examine the potential for treating deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., using a 
person’s beliefs to understand and predict behaviour, and to test the hypothesis that improvements in ToM can be 
distinguished from performance in other domains such as judging line orientation and executive function.  
Materials and Methodology: In Study 1, two individuals with TBI participated in a protocol targeting ToM, which was 
assessed using a cartoon interpretation task. Participants also performed on a short form of the Benton Judgment of Line 
Orientation Task as a control. In Study 2, a third person with TBI participated in Attention Process Training (APT-1) 
followed by the ToM protocol. Executive function was assessed using the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task (PASAT). 
Results: In Study 1, ToM performance but not judgments of line orientation responded to the ToM training. In Study 2, 
executive function, but not ToM, showed strong improvement with APT-1. In contrast, ToM but not executive function 
showed significant improvement with ToM training.  
Conclusion: ToM is a good candidate for intervention. For three persons with TBI, ToM performance showed selective 
improvement associated with ToM treatment, which suggests a practical as well as theoretical value for distinguishing 
ToM from executive function. 
Keywords: Attention, cognitive rehabilitation, executive function, social communication, theory of mind, traumatic brain 
injury. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Many persons with traumatic brain injury (TBI) exhibit 
debilitating cognitive and communication impairments [1-
11]. The language-related symptoms often fall outside the 
traditional definition of aphasia and include difficulty 
understanding a speaker’s goals in a conversation and how 
an utterance serves those goals. Impairment in these areas 
can leave a person unable to appreciate fully, for example, 
sarcasm, deception, and some forms of humour, all of which 
are common and important features of natural conversation 
occurring in work and social contexts. A current organiza-
tional framework for analysing these aspects of communica-
tion is termed Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to use other 
people's beliefs to understand or predict behaviour [12-14]. 
In this paper, we start from the theoretical position that ToM 
is a distinct domain of cognition [13] and then describe work 
with three individuals with TBI to test the usefulness of a 
training program that specifically targets ToM. 
 The following scenario illustrates components of ToM 
and how ToM performance draws on a range of cognitive 
abilities. While at work, Jim spends 45 minutes talking with  
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a friend and, as a result, is late for a meeting with his boss 
and co-workers. People already at the meeting have no direct 
access to the reason for Jim’s lateness; their first-order 
beliefs about the situation are incomplete or incorrect. Jim 
could tell them the literal truth (that he lost track of time 
while talking to a friend). Alternatively, he could save face 
by lying: ‘I was delayed by a call from an important client.’ 
Use of intentional deception rests on the speaker’s (Jim’s) 
second-order beliefs, i.e., what he believes about listeners’ 
beliefs. Jim might attempt a lie if he thinks that his listeners 
do not know the real reason for his tardiness. However, a co-
worker Sally left the meeting to retrieve a file and, 
unbeknownst to Jim, overheard Jim’s conversation with his 
friend. Sally returned to the meeting before Jim and told the 
others the real reason for Jim’s absence, thereby correcting 
their first-order beliefs. When Jim finally enters the meeting, 
he may attempt using a lie based on his false second-order 
belief. Of course, Jim’s attempted deception would fail and 
would result in increased rather than decreased 
embarrassment. On the other hand, if Jim realizes that his 
listeners know the truth, he may still say ‘I was delayed by a 
call from an important client,’ but as an attempt to use ironic 
humor to defuse an awkward situation rather than as an 
attempt to deceive. People at the meeting need ToM to 
understand the intended meaning of true or untrue utterances 
spoken by Jim.  
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 A common method of assessing ToM requires observers 
to interpret false-belief scenarios analogous to the example 
above, which typically involve characters whose conflicting 
beliefs and access to objective truth must be remembered, 
updated, and compared. Also, observers must inhibit 
responding on the basis of objective truth when explaining 
the behaviour of a misinformed character. The structural 
complexity of ToM scenarios and the need to inhibit 
responses based on what an observer knows to be true 
suggest one theoretical perspective: that performance on 
ToM tasks in large part depends on resources shared with 
executive function [15-18].  
 Brain-based studies confirm an association between ToM 
and executive function. Frontal and prefrontal system 
involvement, characteristic of the population of individuals 
with TBI, has often been linked to disrupted executive 
function [19-22] and ToM [23]. In addition, functional 
imaging studies of neurotypical adults similarly suggest 
overlap between brain regions activated during executive 
function and ToM tasks [24, 25]. Finally, Tompkins and 
colleagues [26] compared the performance of individuals 
with right hemisphere brain damage (RHD) on second-order 
belief scenarios [27] to carefully constructed, equivalent 
passages that did not require ToM processing. Their finding 
was that controlling the complexity of stimulus passages, 
that is, controlling the demands placed on executive 
function, eliminated any selective ToM impairment. In sum, 
a large body of behavioural and neurological data document 
the connection between ToM and executive function and, 
accordingly, raise the question whether the ToM construct 
adds anything to our understanding of, and treatment of, 
impaired communication.  
 Although performance on some ToM tasks can be 
explained in terms of more general constructs such as 
executive function, there is, nonetheless, considerable 
evidence for an opposing view that ToM capacity and 
executive function are usefully distinguished. Saxe and her 
colleagues have used functional imaging studies with 
neurologically intact adults to identify temporo-parietal 
regions as particularly relevant for processing mental states 
when stimulus complexity, i.e., executive function demands, 
are well controlled [28-30]. Griffin et al. [31], Happé et al. 
[32], and Lundgren and Brownell [33] report selective ToM 
impairments in patients with RHD, using cartoon interpreta-
tion tasks that reduced working memory demands. Finally, 
Muller and colleagues [9] found no significant correlation 
between components of executive processing and ToM 
abilities in a group of individuals with severe TBI who 
performed worse than controls on a set of verbal and non-
verbal ToM tasks.  
 The hypothesized dissociation between ToM and 
executive function impairment in people with TBI, as well as 
in individuals with brain-damage due to other etiologies, 
provides context for the main empirical questions addressed 
here: is there potential value to treating ToM separately in 
individuals with TBI, and can ToM be improved by training 
directed at components of executive function? The ToM 
training program uses visual support to reduce working 
memory demands and incorporates practice evaluating, 
updating, and comparing mental states. (See Lundgren and 
Brownell [33] for a description of the protocol and results 
from a patient with RHD.) In this paper, we focus on 
individuals with TBI and report a pair of studies using 
variants of a multiple baseline, single subject experimental 
design [34-36] to evaluate this phase II treatment project [37, 
38]. 
 In Study 1, two individuals with TBI were enrolled in the 
ToM protocol. Their performances were repeatedly assessed 
using two measures. The first was a Cartoon Interpretation 
task that used cartoons selected from Gary Larson's The Far 
Side [39] whose ‘meaning’ or humour relies on first-order 
beliefs (a character’s ignorance about reality) or second-
order beliefs (one character’s deceiving another character). 
During each session, the participant interpreted 2 first-order 
and 2 second-order belief items. The participant was asked to 
identify salient features in the picture, read the caption, and, 
finally, describe what most people would find amusing. It 
was not important that the participant judged the cartoon to 
be funny, but that he understood what most people would 
identify as being humorous. A 0-6 scale for scoring quality 
of Cartoon Interpretations (inter-rater reliability = 90%) [40] 
was used to evaluate the individual’s performance. Three 
judges rated each interpretation and then resolved any 
discrepancies via discussion.  
  The second dependent measure, also obtained at each 
session, was a short form of the Benton Judgment of Line 
Orientation Task [41]. In this visuo-spatial task, a line 
segment at an angle is presented and then removed from 
view. The examinee then selects a line segment with a 
matching orientation from an array of choices. As a control 
task that was not treated, judgment of line orientation was 
not expected to change. Thus, the main hypothesis tested in 
Study 1 was that training ToM would improve performance 
in this domain selectively, that is, that performance on ToM 
would improve while visuospatial performance would not. 
 Study 2 examined the value of ToM training over and 
above prior training that involved working memory, 
inhibition, and attention -- all key components of executive 
function that are plausibly required for good performance in 
many ToM paradigms and that are often impaired in persons 
with TBI. In Study 2, we enrolled a third individual with TBI 
to again explore the potential for training ToM. We are not 
hypothesizing a total separation of ToM from executive 
function. Instead, we test that there is enough separation 
between ToM and executive function to justify evaluating 
and treating ToM separately. 
 For the training phase, we used a slightly modified 
version of the Attention Training Program (APT-1) [42] 
which is effective for treating attention deficits in adults with 
TBI [43-47]. This multilevel treatment program targets 
selective, sustained, divided and alternating attention along a 
continuum of easiest to most difficult. Our modifications to 
Sohlberg and Mateer’s APT-1 protocol included reducing 
the number of sessions taken to administer this program to 
10. 
 For assessing change in executive function, we used 
Gronwall’s Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task (PASAT), 
which requires sustained attention, inhibition, and working 
memory [48-50]. In PASAT, the participant listens to single 
digits presented every 3 seconds on an audio CD. (There is 
also a 2-second version that was not used). The task is 
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adding the two last digits heard and reporting the sum: if the 
first two digits were 6 and 7, the participant would respond 
‘thirteen’; if the third digit was 4, the participant would then 
respond ‘eleven’, and so on. The maximum score is 60 
(based on 61 presented digits). While PASAT performance 
is sensitive to practice effects, these are described as greatest 
in the first few administrations [50]. 
 In sum, we report results from two studies that test the 
efficacy of a ToM protocol that uses visual support and 
provides practice with mental states. In Study 1, we contrast 
ToM performance with visuospatial ability. In Study 2 we 
distinguish gains in ToM from gains associated with 
previous training with elements of executive function. 
MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
 Three individuals with TBI were recruited to participate. 
All three satisfied the following criteria: moderate to severe 
TBI defined by the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) immediately 
following injury; geographical proximity to testers; no report 
of significant drug or alcohol use, prior neurologic or 
psychiatric illness, dysarthria or aphasia, or pre-existing 
learning disability; no report of impaired (uncorrected) 
hearing or vision; completion of high school; and having 
grown up using American English. All three presented with 
reduced interpersonal and conversational skills, although this 
clinical judgment was not documented with formal testing. 
All signed an IRB-approved consent form. All had been 
discharged from any cognitive rehabilitation programs prior 
to enrolment. See Table 1 for additional description of the 
participants, including targeted cognitive-linguistic testing. 
 Study 1. One individual with TBI, S01, was a 58-year-
old man two years post injury due to a motorcycle accident. 
His TBI was initially classified as severe (GCS = 3). A 
second person with TBI, S02, was a 27-year-old man three 
years post injury due to a motor vehicle accident. His TBI 
was also initially classified as severe (GCS = 4).  
 Study 2. A third person with TBI, S03, was a 25-year-old 
man one-year post injury due to a motor vehicle accident. 
His TBI was initially classified as severe (GCS = 4). 
Procedures 
 Study 1. Two primary dependent measures in Study 1, 
Cartoon Interpretation and Line Orientation, were obtained 
at all sessions--during the initial baseline, during training, 
and after training had ceased.  
Protocol Description 
 Pre-training Baseline (Sessions 1-10, 3 per week for 
approximately 3 weeks): Each session included assessment 
of Cartoon Interpretation and Line Orientation (10 data 
points for each dependent measure).  
 ToM Training (Sessions 11 – 19 for S01, 11-20 for S02, 
3 per week for approximately 3.5 weeks): Each one-hour 
training session included ToM training plus assessment of 
Cartoon Interpretation and Line Orientation tasks (approxi-
mately 10 data points for each dependent measure). 
 Post-training Baseline (Sessions 20-29 for S01, 21-30 for 
S02, 3 per week): Each session included assessment of 
Cartoon Interpretation and Line Orientation (10 data points 
for each dependent measure).  
 The ToM Training Program [33]
 
entails extensive 
practice with mental state operations that require (1) 
generating thoughts about pictured objects from another’s 
perspective; (2) evaluating one or two characters’ beliefs 
(true or false) as objects change form and as the characters 
change location within a depicted house, thereby changing 
their perceptual access to updated information; (3) evaluating 
differences between characters' beliefs; and (4) inhibiting 
personalized thoughts unrelated to the characters. Our 
training program uses visual support (e.g., a cut away 
drawing of a house with different rooms in which different 
characters can be located) to support multiple opportunities 
for a participant to practice, correct, and learn skills 
necessary to progress from one phase of the training program 
to another. Training begins with the Warm-Up Phase and is 
followed by four distinct training phases that start with first-
order beliefs and progress to include second-order beliefs, 
including intentional deception. Different participants 
progress through the training at different rates and require 
varying numbers of sessions. 
 Study 2. Used a more complex design. Two primary 
dependent measures were obtained in Study 2 in each of 48 
sessions-during the initial baseline, during both trainings, 
and when no training was administered. The first was the 
score on Cartoon Interpretation. One difference in this 
measure from Study 1 is that in Study 2, S03 was asked to 
interpret only one first-order item and one second-order item 
for each assessment in order to leave sufficient cartoons for 
the greater number of assessments administered in Study 2. 
The second dependent measure was the PASAT. 
Protocol Description 
 Pre-training Baseline (Sessions 1-7, three per week for 
approximately 2.5 weeks): Each session included assessment 
of Cartoon Interpretation and PASAT (7 data points for each 
dependent measure). 
 APT-1 Training (Sessions 8-17, 3 per week for 
approximately 3.5 weeks during APT-1): Each training 
session included APT-1 training plus assessment of Cartoon 
Interpretation and PASAT (10 data points for each 
dependent measure). 
 Post-APT-1 Training Baseline (Sessions 18-31, 3 per 
week): Each session included assessment of Cartoon 
Interpretation and PASAT (14 data points for each 
dependent measure) with no training. 
 ToM Training (Sessions 32-41, 3 per week): Each session 
included ToM training plus assessment of Cartoon 
Interpretation and PASAT (10 data points for each 
dependent measure). 
 Post-ToM Training (Sessions 42-48, 3 per week): Each 
session included assessment of Cartoon Interpretation and 
PASAT (7 data points for each dependent measure) with no 
training. 
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Table 1. Participant data. 
Participant S01 S02 S03 
Age 58 27 24 
Years of education 16 14 13 
Time Post Onset (years) 2 3 1 
Gender Male Male Male 
Race White White White 
Vocation 
Pre injury 
 
 
 
Post injury 
 
Administrator in a large 
international company 
 
 
Volunteer in a hospital 
 
Police Officer 
 
 
 
Unemployed 
 
College Student 
 
 
 
Unemployed 
Initial Glasgow Coma Scale Score 3 4 4 
Communication/cognitive features Verbose, tangential, impulsive 
Poor initiation, flat affect, 
difficulty reading social cues 
Poor initiation, flat affect 
Test of Everyday Attention [51] 
Scaled Scores (M=10) 
 
Map Search (SD=2.6) 
Elevator Counting with Distractions (SD=2.3) 
Visual Elevator (SD=2.4) 
Elevator Counting with Reversal (SD=2.1) 
Telephone Search while Counting (SD=2.6) 
Lottery (SD=2.46) 
  
Pre/Post APT 
 
 
6/7 
7/12 
5/7 
3/7 
6/15 
1/5 
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System [52] 
Scaled Score (M=10; SD=3) 
 
 
Color-Word Interference Test 
Inhibition/Switching 
Pre/Post 
 
 
 
 
7/12 
Pre/Post 
 
 
 
 
10/12 
Pre/Post 
 
 
 
 
4/7 
Cognitive-Linguistic Quick Test [53] 
(Used to screen language skills prior to training.) 
Cognitive Domain of Language: 
Personal Facts 
Confrontation Naming 
Story Retell 
Generative Naming 
Score/Severity Rating 
31(WNL) 
 
 
 
 
 
Score/Severity Rating 
34(WNL) 
 
 
 
 
 
Score/Severity Rating 
27(Mild) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
Overview of Analysis 
 We rely on statistical as well as visual evidence to 
evaluate training effects [54]. How large a change  
in performance occurred is expressed using Cohen’s d 
defined as:  
d = (MeanPost initiation of treatment – MeanPre-Treatment Baseline) / SDPre-
Treatment Baseline. 
 Effect size calculated in this way provides a conservative 
index because the post initiation of training mean includes 
data from training sessions during which performance 
changes most rapidly: ‘post training’ means would generally 
be higher if based only on sessions taking place after training 
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had ceased. The conservative definition of effect size is used 
to be consistent with the division of sessions (pre- versus 
post-initiation of training) used for the inferential analyses 
presented below. In Study 2 we augment the basic results by 
presenting an alternative, less conservative effect size that 
excludes data from training sessions during which 
performance was changing most rapidly. These 
supplementary results highlight differences in Baseline 
performance (prior to any training) and performance after 
completion of training. 
 While effect sizes for single subject investigations of 
ToM are hard to interpret without context provided by other 
treatment studies for ToM, Beeson and Robey and others 
[55, 56] have suggested the following benchmarks for single 
subject studies of aphasia treatments: small = 2.6, medium = 
3.9, and large = 5.8. These guidelines are quite different 
from those often cited for group studies, for which a Cohen’s 
d of .8 or higher is considered ‘large.’  
 We evaluate the statistical significance of training effects 
using correlational analysis and a combination of 
bootstrapping and simulation (Simulation Modeling Analysis 
or SMA) recently outlined by Borckardt et al. [57]. All 
Baseline, Pre-initiation of training sessions were coded as 0, 
and all post-initiation of training sessions (during and after 
training) were coded as 1. The dependent variables were 
Cartoon Interpretation score and Line orientation score (in 
Study 1) or Cartoon Interpretation and PASAT (in Study 2). 
The point biserial correlation between Pre- versus Post-
initiation of training and performance provides the starting 
point. However, this correlation conflates improvement 
coincident with the start of training with any other factors 
that might exert effects across all sessions independent of 
training: e.g., gradual improvement due to practice, 
familiarity with assessment measures, spontaneous recovery, 
benefits of social stimulation, etc. In order to test the 
statistical significance of a training effect apart from other, 
nonspecific factors, the Borckardt et al. [57] SMA avoids the 
problems interpreting p values from conventional procedures 
(regression, analysis of variance) applied to data from a 
single subject [58]. Rather than compare differences in mean 
performance using a conventional error term based on non 
independent observations, the software starts by calculating 
the degree to which a response from a single person depends 
on what the person responded on the previous session (the 
lag 1 autocorrelation) across all sessions before, during, and 
after training. The autocorrelation provides an index of 
steady change across the entire set of sessions. The SMA 
software then generates thousands of simulated data sets 
with the same autocorrelation to provide a statistical context 
for what would happen under the null hypothesis of steady 
change across all sessions without any specific training 
effect. The critical step for establishing statistical 
significance is comparing the obtained data that includes a 
training effect as well as steady change against the set of null 
hypothesis simulation samples. The question is whether the 
obtained difference between before and after the start of 
training is greater than the difference found in 95% of the 
null hypothesis simulations that represent what to expect just 
on the basis of practice. In sum, this analysis takes into  
 
 
consideration both gradual improvement due to practice and 
also the variability that is so common in brain injured 
performance, which makes the traditional requirement for a 
stable baseline prior to initiation of treatment less critical. 
The test of statistical significance also takes into 
consideration any autocorrelation across data points from a 
single individual.  
 The Borckardt et al. [57] SMA works best with a 
minimum of approximately 20 sessions. In Study 1 we a 
priori decided to administer 10 Baseline sessions to each 
participant to insure sufficient data points both pre- as well 
as post-initiation of training. (Study 2 was longer overall.) 
The high, fixed number of sessions prior to the start of 
training did not detract from participants’ willingness to 
complete the protocol.  
 To supplement the statistical evaluation, we also present 
graphs for which each participant’s Cartoon Interpretation 
scores across all sessions were converted to z score form, as 
were his line orientation scores (in Study 1) or PASAT 
scores (in Study 2). These transformations equate the 
variability of different dependent measures, which facilitates 
comparisons of changes in performance across dependent 
measures and (in Study 2) across training protocols. Finally, 
we present values for the Coefficient of Variation to express 
how variable scores are in a form that allows comparison 
across participants and across studies. The Coefficient of 
Variation is defined as (SD / Mean) x 100 [59]. 
 Study 1.  Figs. (1 and 2) and Table 2 show the scores for 
Cartoon Interpretation and Benton Line Orientation Task for 
S01 and S02, respectively, across all sessions in the study.  
 For S01, Table 2 and Fig. (2) show that his Cartoon 
Interpretation improved after initiation of ToM training in 
Session 11, while his Line orientation performance did not. 
The effect sizes were quite different (d = +3.99 for Cartoon 
Interpretation and d = -.26 indicating slightly worse 
performance over sessions for line orientation).  
 For S01, the correlation between Pre versus Post-
Initiation of Training and Cartoon performance, r = +.80, 
was significant, p = .03 (according to the Borckardt et al. 
[57] SMA), which supports the existence effect of treatment 
that is distinct from general improvement due to practice, as 
shown in Fig. (1). In contrast, line orientation performance 
showed no hint of improvement attributable to some effect 
specific to the ToM training (r = -.13, p = .47). All told, there 
is good evidence for improvement in ToM performance that 
can reasonably be linked to the training. 
 S02 similarly showed good evidence for a selective effect 
of ToM training. His effect size for Cartoon Interpretation 
was d = +4.80, while his effect size for Line orientation was 
very small, d = -.49. The r value for the Pre versus Post-
Initiation of training and Cartoon Interpretation was strong, r 
= +.86 and significant (p < .01) even in the context of steady 
improvement across sessions as illustrated in Fig. (2). There 
was no hint of an effect in Line Orientation, r = -.20, p = .48, 
as shown in Fig. (2). S02 thus provides additional evidence 
for a selective ToM training effect.  
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Fig. (1). Responses from S01 (Study 1) for cartoon interpretation (solid line) and judgments of line orientation (dashed line). Arrows indicate 
the beginning and end of Theory of Mind treatment sessions. 
 
Fig. (2). Responses from S02 (Study 1) for cartoon interpretation (solid line) and judgments of line orientation (dashed line). Arrows indicate 
the beginning and end of Theory of Mind treatment sessions. 
 
Table 2. Results for ToM training (Study 1). 
S01 
ToM Training: Cartoon Interpretation Task 
   
 Pre Training Baseline Post Initiation of Training Cohen’s d:[Post-Pre]/SDPre 
Mean 9.0 14.95 3.99 
Standard Deviation (SD) 1.49 2.53  
Coefficient of Variation 16.56 16.92  
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Table 2. contd… 
S01 
ToM Training: Line Orientation Task 
   
 Pre Training Baseline Post Initiation of Training Cohen’s d:[Post-Pre]/SDPre 
Mean 13.30 13.00 - 0.26 
Standard Deviation (SD) 1.16 1.05  
Coefficient of Variation 8.72 8.08  
S02 
ToM Training: Cartoon Interpretation Task 
   
 Pre Training Baseline Post Initiation of Training Cohen’s d:[Post-Pre]/SDPre 
Mean 8.40 15.65 4.80 
Standard Deviation (SD) 1.51 2.32  
Coefficient of Variation 17.98 14.82  
S02 
ToM Training: Line Orientation Task 
   
 Pre Training Baseline Post Initiation of Training Cohen’s d:[Post-Pre]/SDPre 
Mean 12.20 11.90 - 0.48 
Standard Deviation (SD) 0.63 0.79  
Coefficient of Variation 5.16 6.64  
 
 
Fig. (3). Responses from S03 (Study 2) for cartoon interpretation (solid line) and judgments of line orientation (dashed line). Thick arrows 
indicate the beginning and end of attention process training, and thin arrows indicate the beginning and end of Theory of Mind training. 
 
Study 2. 
 Attention Processing Training (APT-1). Fig. (3) shows 
S03’s scores for PASAT and Cartoon Interpretation across 
the 48 sessions in the entire study. Results are summarized in 
Table 3. 
 This individual showed evidence of an effect specific to 
the APT-1 training over and above a steady increase over 
sessions, which was also present. First, we calculated 
correlations using pre- (Sessions 1 – 7) versus post-initiation 
of training assessments (Sessions 8 – 31) for both PASAT 
and Cartoon Interpretation score. (Recall ToM training  
 
began at Session 32.) There was clear improvement in 
PASAT performance: r= +.82, p = .01; PASAT effect size: d 
= +7.05. There was less evidence for change in the Cartoon 
scores associated with the initiation of APT-1: r = +.32, p = 
.10, effect size: d = +.72. This portion of the study is 
consistent with an effect of APT-1 on executive function as 
measured by the PASAT. 
 Theory of Mind Training. ToM training was associated 
with slight, not quite significant, additional improvement on 
PASAT. Pre ToM training performance was based on data 
from Session 18 (just after APT-1 training ceased) through  
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Session 31. ToM training started in Session 32 and continued 
through Session 41. PASAT effect size was relatively small, 
d = +1.10. The point biserial correlation was r = +.62, p = . 11. 
Fig. (3) further suggests some steady linear improvement 
unrelated to treatment.  
 In contrast, ToM training was associated with significant 
improvement on Cartoon Interpretation. The ToM effect size 
based on the comparison between sessions immediately after 
the end of APT but before the start of ToM training (i.e., 
Session 18 – Session 31, inclusive) and the post initiation of 
training mean (i.e., Sessions 32-48) was larger, d = +2.07, 
and the point biserial correlation was significant, r = +.75,  
p < .01. We then repeated the Borckardt et al. [57] SMA 
using data from all sessions up until the start of ToM training 
(i.e., Sessions 1 through 31 rather than just Sessions 18 – 31) 
because no ToM training was administered during Sessions 1 
- 31. The analysis comparing Sessions 1 – 31 to Sessions 32 
– 48 yielded virtually identical simulation results in support 
of an independent effect of training: r = +.76, p < .01. These  
 
results lend additional evidence in favour of ToM as a 
distinct cognitive domain.  
 An alternative, less conservative evaluation rests on a 
comparison that excludes data from training sessions 
because performance changed markedly during training 
phases. Sessions 25 – 31 were devoid of any training. When 
the Cartoon Interpretation mean for these 7 sessions was 
compared to the Cartoon Interpretation mean for Sessions 
41-48 during which there was similarly no training, the 
effect size increased to a moderate size, d = +4.3. 
DISCUSSION 
 These two studies provide preliminary evidence for the 
selective impact of a ToM training protocol for individuals 
with TBI [33]. Study 1 showed that improvement on a ToM 
measure can dissociate from a measure of performance in the 
visuospatial domain and yielded effect sizes that might be  
 
Table 3. Results for ToM training and APT-1 training (Study 2). 
S03 
APT-1 
TRAINING: Cartoon Interpretation Task 
   
 Pre Training Baseline Post Initiation of Training Cohen’s d:[Post-Pre]/SDPre 
Mean 1.39 2.08 +.72 
Standard Deviation (SD) 0.96 0.86  
Coefficient of Variation 69.06 41.35  
S03 
APT-1 
TRAINING: PASAT 
   
 Pre Training Baseline Post Initiation of Training Cohen’s d:[Post-Pre]/SDPre 
Mean 20.86 41.79 +7.05 
Standard Deviation (SD) 2.97 6.90  
Coefficient of Variation 14.24 16.51  
S03 
ToM 
TRAINING: Cartoon Interpretation Task 
   
 Pre Training Baseline Post Initiation of Training Cohen’s d:[Post-Pre]/SDPre 
Mean 1.93 4.00 +2.25 
Standard Deviation (SD) 0.92 0.79  
Coefficient of Variation 47.67 19.75  
S03 
ToM 
TRAINING: PASAT 
   
 Pre Training Baseline Post Initiation of Training Cohen’s d:[Post-Pre]/SDPre 
Mean 45.86 48.88 +1.10 
Standard Deviation (SD) 2.74 0.93  
Coefficient of Variation 5.97 1.90  
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tentatively characterized as ‘medium’ [55, 56]. Study 2 
presented additional evidence that ToM training was 
associated with a significant impact on the ToM performance 
beyond any gains associated with prior training (APT-1) 
directed at executive function or practice. These results 
confirm that there is a degree of functional and clinically 
relevant dissociation between ToM performance and aspects 
of visual perception or executive function. The implication is 
that domain-specific treatment can provide measurable 
impact on ToM for some individuals with TBI. More 
generally, these results highlight the potential for treating 
deficits in social cognition and discourse level communica-
tion. 
 There are many limitations to the present study. Most 
important is that the scope of generalization of treatment 
gains is not yet defined. The Cartoon Interpretation task is 
itself dissimilar to the training materials and thus documents 
some degree of generalization, but the ultimate test will be a 
person’s success in naturally occurring social situations. We 
also need to consider the immediate practical issue of how 
well the ToM training protocol will work with other 
individuals, male or female, who vary in terms of severity of 
impairment and in symptom profile.  
Our results add to the body of findings on the status of ToM 
within a general theory of cognition, but raise a number of 
conceptual issues. The findings reported are consistent with 
the studies by Saxe and colleagues [29, 30] that show that is 
possible to dissociate ToM from other cognitive domains 
under the right conditions. However, our findings in Study 2 
also confirm the need for careful consideration of potential 
overlap between ToM and executive function [e. g., 26]: 
although the effect was statistically weak, this one individual 
displayed a hint of improvement (d = +.72) in ToM 
associated with APT-1. Other individuals with TBI may 
show stronger improvement in ToM coincident with APT-1 
or equivalent training that targets executive function. ToM 
performance can in principle dissociate from executive 
function, but ToM performance can also overlap to varying 
degrees with executive function. 
 In Study 2, we chose a conservative approach to testing 
the efficacy of ToM training by administering the APT-1 
first. Our goal was to test whether ToM performance can 
benefit from separate treatment, even after a person has 
experienced training and assessment of executive function 
using APT-1 and the PASAT, which does not require 
understanding or manipulating mental states. Our results are 
consistent with the view that ToM is a distinct cognitive 
domain that should be targeted for treatment at least in some 
individuals. However, the design of Study 2 does not support 
evaluation of possible carryover effects between the APT-1 
and ToM protocols. Because ToM training provides practice 
and feedback applying assorted cognitive skills (e.g., 
updating, inhibition) in addition to practice monitoring 
beliefs, administering ToM training first might well lead to 
substantial improvement on PASAT as well as on Cartoon 
Interpretation. It is also logically possible that the 
effectiveness of ToM training could be enhanced by prior 
exposure to APT-1. Again, our main point is the potential 
value of treating ToM. We leave for future research the  
 
 
question of exactly how the sequence of these two protocols 
affects treatment gains. This is a difficult question because 
the degree of overlap between processing limitations 
affecting the two domains and protocols will vary from 
person to person. 
 ToM, as studied here, may also be relevant to other 
cognitive tasks, such as distinguishing accidental from 
intentional harm [60, 61] and distinguishing intentional from 
unintentional violation of social norms [62]. The exciting 
possibility is that training ToM may affect performance in 
selected social cognitive domains and thereby increase the 
usefulness of intervention.  
 A last point concerns a connection between APT-1 and 
executive function during the beginning sessions of Study 2. 
The literature is mixed on whether benefits of APT-1 extend 
beyond attention and whether APT-1 ought to be used to 
treat executive dysfunction [47]. Our view is that PASAT 
provides an index of executive function, and that our data are 
at least consistent with the view that APT-1 can impact 
executive function under some conditions. 
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